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 Currently, in their eighth month of protests, all protesting Algerians have one goal in 
mind: electing an actual president, not a figurehead. Today, Algeria’s political power remains 
consolidated in a group of army leaders. Even with the promise of democratic elections, 
Algerians refuse to cease protesting until the military-led regime ends.  Algeria’s current issue 1
continues as an extension of its tumultuous relationship with other military powers. Such 
instability can be traced back to Algeria’s fight for independence: Algerian independence relied 
heavily upon the leadership of a political group that holds strong influence over the current 
government. Coming under the French army’s control in 1830, Algeria rapidly became first a 
French colony, then a part of France itself.  Since then, Algerians have made various attempts at 2
rebellions against the French government which did little to contribute to their struggle for 
independence. With the prolonged duration of France’s colonial control over Algeria, the 
demographic makeup of Algeria consisted of two groups: the native Algerians consisting of 
Muslim Arabs and Berbers, and the pieds-noirs.  The non-homologous makeup of Algeria made 3
it increasingly difficult for native Algerians to gain freedom: pieds-noirs held most of the power 
in the Algerian faction of the French government and society.  The tide began to turn around the 4
start of the war in 1954 with Muslim Algerians forming and joining nationalist groups like the 
F.L.N.  After years of fighting, Charles de Gaulle opened up negotiations with the predominant 5
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nationalist group, the F.L.N., eventually leading to the liberation of Algeria in March of 1962.  6
Such liberation was determined by the Évian Accords.  France’s response to Algeria’s uprising 7
led to domestic criticism of France’s role in Algeria and led to international sympathy for 
Algeria’s cause. Algeria’s success in gaining independence was dependent on a multitude of 
factors, but most significantly upon the Algerian Muslims’ ability to not only ideologically  
separate themselves from pieds-noirs, but also their ability to gain domestic and international 
sympathy, including support from other African countries and the United States. This, in turn, put 
pressure on the French government, leading to the Évian Accords. 
 Algeria came to be under French colonial rule for 132 years due to an argument between 
a French official and the Dey of Regency, the ruler of the land that came to be Algeria. On the 
day of April 29, 1827 the Dey and a French consul met in Algiers. Both were trying to resolve 
trade deal issues, but the French side remained indifferent to the Dey’s numerous attempts to 
solve the debt problem. As a result, the Dey grew frustrated, and tapped the consul’s shoulder 
with a fly whisk as a signal to terminate the meeting.  The consul took such action as an insult to 8
the honor of France. As such, Charles X, the ruler of France at the time, demanded that the 
Turkish ruler in Algiers fly the French flag over Algiers and that France should be given a one-
hundred-gun salute.  With the Dey refusing to cede to France on such demands, France placed a 9
blockade on Algerian ports. Such action held little power to change the Dey’s mind. However, 
France succeeded in gaining revenge when on June 14, 1830, Sidi Ferruch, a town 21km away 
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from Algiers was invaded by some 37,607 French soldiers.  Three weeks later, the French 10
soldiers captured the city of Algiers, signaling the start of French colonization in Algeria.  11
 The unplanned victory on the part of France led to the formation of governmental 
structures intended to benefit France and French citizens. A governor-general held civil and 
military jurisdiction over Algeria, which was formally annexed as a colony of France in 1834. 
The French military established bureaux arabes, departments intended to take care of Muslim 
affairs. With the rise of the French Second Republic in 1848, three départements were formed for 
the territorial areas of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine. These départements were under the rule of 
the civilian government, marking Algeria no longer a colony, but an extension of mainland 
France. Such changes paired with other arrangements, separated the French Algerian population 
into two groups: the privileged pieds-noirs and the oppressed Arabs and Berbers alike.  12
 Various orders and edicts effectively dismembered the previous culture of Muslims in the 
area while suppressing the current population. By the 1840s, France had confiscated many tribal 
and communal lands, pushing native Muslims away from the fertile land.  An 1863 statute 13
privatized communally held land, which harmed the tribal economy by undermining the 
authority and power of the tribe.  Following in 1865, a decree was made by France, intending to 14
give Muslims an equal position to the pieds-noirs by giving Muslims the title of French subjects, 
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but not French citizens.  Subjects were able to enter the civil service, serve in the army, and 15
migrate, but had less political influence than citizens. In order to become a citizen, they would 
have to renounce their personal status and allegiance to Islamic law. As such, many Muslim 
Algerians refused to become citizens as they would have to forfeit their religion for it.   This 16
decree created subsequent barriers in both the political and civil spheres for all Algerians. 
Consequently, many native Algerians saw no need to obtain complete liberation from France, but 
rather preferred to assimilate and gain other rights in a peaceful manner.  On the other hand, 17
native Algerians who desired sovereignty turned to creating nationalist groups.  
 The F.L.N. was formed in 1954 and had an armed wing called the National Liberation 
Army or A.L.N.  By 1956, nearly all previous Algerian leaders and intellectuals belonged to this 18
nationalist group.  The F.L.N. became the central nationalist group, forcing all other political 19
parties to merge under the F.L.N. and give up their status as nationalist groups.  Such action 20
removed many moderate nationalist groups from Algeria.  The F.L.N. used a variety of military 21
and political tactics, from guerrilla warfare to the F.L.N.’s use of terrorism against Algerian 
citizens.  Even from afar, those in mainland France were influenced by the war. 22
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 With domestic disenchantment with the situation in Algeria, apprehension arose 
surrounding a potential uprising of settlers and the French military, who were angered by 
resentment expressed in the public opinion of those in mainland France. Those in mainland 
France, upon hearing of repeated torture against the Muslim population, were unhappy with 
French in Algeria who still desired to win the war.  This apprehension led to the election of 23
Charles de Gaulle, who in an effort to resolve the conflict, offered up enfranchising the 
Algerians. Such offer angered the pieds-noirs and did little to appease the F.L.N.’s call for 
sovereignty.  In response, a provisional government called the GPRA  was formed. De Gaulle, 24 25
under immense pressure, caved to the F.L.N. and began negotiations with them in 1960, which 
was followed by the mutual approval of a referendum on independence by the French and 
Muslim population in early 1961. Finally, in 1962, the Évian Accords were signed, indicating the 
end of France’s rule over Algeria.  Such accords “recognized the right of the Algerians to 26
choose [...] their political destiny in relations to the French Republic.”  All those living in 27
Algeria were given a three year period in which they could determine what citizenship they 
desired.   28
 The formation of the F.L.N. and the subsequent dominance they exerted over all other 
nationalist groups, led to a more unified fight for freedom while ensuring a clear split between 
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pieds-noirs and Native Algerians. In an observation of nationalist feelings through his time in 
French Africa, Neville Barbour observed, “the conception of an Algerian nation [...] [was] not 
easily arrived at, particularly as a century of French rule has destroyed such symbols of native 
sovereignty as previously existed.”  For any liberation movement to succeed, a thirst for 29
sovereignty must be present. With symbols of native sovereignty erased, those native Algerians 
who desired complete separation from France had no unified manner of expressing their hope of 
liberation. The creation of the F.L.N. provided such ideological organization to Algerians. The 
F.L.N.’s use of threats of violence and executions against Muslims to bring about financial 
support hints at the F.L.N.’s methods by which the F.L.N. exerted dominance over other 
nationalist groups.  With the hegemony the F.L.N. created, they provided an unified 30
representation of hope of native sovereignty. Dually, the hegemony of the F.L.N. removed some 
uncertainty about the future government of a newly liberated Algeria. With one sole nationalist 
group, the Algerian fight for liberation was unified under one name, reducing the possibility of 
inter-conflict between Algerians desiring liberation. Such unification created a stronger system to 
fight for independence. 
 Terrorist and guerrilla tactics not only drew attention to the  F.L.N., but also led to many 
Muslims supporting the F.L.N.. David Galula, a Lieutenant Colonel who commanded French 
troops in the Algerian War, observed the F.L.N.’s tactics, saying, “a grenade or bomb in a café  
would produce far more noise than an obscure ambush against French soldiers in the Ouarsenis 
Mountains.”  Instead of the F.L.N. focusing efforts on ambushing the French soldiers in an 31
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geographically strategic location, the F.L.N. used less manpower through terrorist tactics to 
create chaos within a more densely populated area. The Battle of Algiers was a prime example of 
such tactic; the use of “no more than five hundred” F.L.N. supporters contributed to the paralysis 
of a city of 700,000 and led to the enactment of the Special Power’s Act, which provided General 
Massu the authority to address such terrorism.  Massu’s leadership later became  a point of 32
contention within the French community.  By focusing on creating conflict in populated areas 33
instead of rural areas, the F.L.N. exacerbated the consequences of conflict in order to gain 
domestic and international attention. Additionally, as Galula observed, the attacks targeting the 
pieds-noirs instead of targeting the French army, led to “blind reactions” against Algerian 
Muslims by the pieds-noirs.  Now instead of the French citizens simply oppressing Algerians 34
through systems, the French citizens now physically harmed Algerians as well. Such reactions 
pushed Algerians to support the F.L.N. in spite of the F.L.N.’s questionable methods of achieving 
liberation. Those native Algerians who had once hoped to assimilate now were forced to demand 
sovereignty as well. Ferhat Abbas, who eventually joined the F.L.N. and acted as first president 
of the independent Algeria at one point said, “We are Frenchmen with the personal status of 
Muslims.”   His transition from assimilationist to leader within a nationalist group fighting for 35
independence indicated the necessity of unification for France to appropriately recognize 
Algerian Muslims. With the hegemony of the F.L.N., Muslims had very few other nationalist or 
religious groups to turn to. In avoiding military strategies, the F.L.N.’s tactics sought to create 
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ideological divide between the Muslim Algerians and pieds-noirs and to draw outside attention 
to their cause. The F.L.N. ultimately unified oppressed Algerians under one united front with the 
common goal of independence.  With the F.L.N. using a system of cells to recruit and carry out 
attacks on urban and rural areas, the French army responded in violent and unethical ways. 
French figures like General Massu turned to the use of torture interrogation methods to 
determine the plans of the nationalist organization.   36
 The use of controversial methods to subdue the F.L.N. and awareness of such methods 
caused domestic scorn for France’s actions in Algeria. Within the police force in Algeria, the 
secretary-general of the police from 1956 to 1958, Paul Teitgen, responded to questions about the 
torture of people under arrest, testifying, “It was because of that that I gave up my post.”  The 37
resignation of any high ranked official provokes questions, but even more noteworthy was 
Teitgen’s explicitness in revealing his reason for resigning. His openness in the justification for 
his resignation demonstrated that even those with the presumed jobs of silencing the Algerian 
nationalists were opposed to the means used to achieve the intended goal. While Teitgen never 
explicitly stated his support for the Algerian cause, his words undercut the French government’s 
moral justification in the opposition of Algeria’s fight for freedom. His reaction provided further 
support to French individuals conflicted over France’s continued efforts in maintaining control 
over Algeria. Likewise, within the French army, soldiers began deserting their posts, leading to 
outrage and support. One form of support came through a manifesto, signed by 142 French 
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intellectuals, including the French actress, Danielle Delorme.  This support furthered the French 38
public’s questioning of the moral authority of France ruling Algeria. The very purpose of a 
manifesto is to draw awareness to a group or individual’s explicit views. Manifestos carry 
inherently political implications. Thus, such a manifesto carried political criticism of the French 
government. Through the support of significant French figures such as Delorme, the outcry 
against the French government’s actions arguably became a more mainstream stance to take. 
Such stance allowed for the expansion of criticism to come from not only those directly involved 
in Algeria, but the general public as well. 
 With the continued outrage against France’s actions, the youth’s outrage spurred concern 
about the ideological divide forming within the French nation.  Pierre Vidal-Naquet, a 
intellectual who signed the manifesto that demanded the French government respect the 
conscientious objection of French soldiers, observed that the National Association of French 
Students, a union, “representing more than 100,000 students was prepared to state publicly that 
the solidarity of the nation was threatened by torture being an essential element in the war.”  39
With the youth of France clearly expressing dissatisfaction with France, the French government 
ran the risk of a generational divide between the younger generations and older generations. 
Youth often carry the passion necessary for political protests that disrupt the normalcy within 
society. Thus, French youth’s questioning of the authority of the government weakened the 
stability of the nation and contributed to the division of the French public. The stability of France 
weakened not only domestically, but also internationally.  
 Own correspondence, “F.L.N. Trial Arouses French Opinion” The Times (London, England), September 28, 1960. 38
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 In an international context, some French intellectuals expressed concern over such 
controversial tactics. In the aftermath of the Algerian War, Pierre Vidal-Naquet worried about the 
torturers being granted amnesty, as such amnesty made “nonsense” of the International 
Declaration on Human Rights, and the Nuremberg Trials. Additionally he observed, “ By 
International Law, any country is entitled to punish a crime against humanity.”   While Vidal-40
Naquet referred to the amnesty granted at the end of the war inciting potential extrajudicial 
prosecution, such prosecution against France could have been pursued before the end of the war. 
France’s role in Algeria became questionable when the French army and the police employed 
unethical means to break up the Algerian Revolution. By undermining human rights documents, 
France undermined its own moral standing. Especially in this time surrounding the start of the 
Cold War and the end of WWII, the Allies were in a ideological struggle with Communist 
nations. This ideological fight manifested through each nation attempting to exert their moral 
superiority over one another. The very formation of the UDHR,  through a Commission ran by 41
Eleanor Roosevelt, carried twinges of conflict between the U.S.S.R. representative and other 
representatives.  So when France used tactics that infringed upon the rights of others and 42
violated the UDHR, France weakened its position in the international community by opening up 
the opportunity for other nations to exert dominance over France through the legal prosecution of  
French torturers. This highlighted France’s inability to uphold the democratic tenant of justice 
within its own jurisdiction. France inadvertently placed itself in a vulnerable position as the use 
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of torture in Algeria severely undermined the morality of France, and thus, threatened the very 
democracy of France. 
 Through the clear cut demands of the F.L.N. for democratic freedom, the Algerian cause 
gained international sympathy from countries invested in freedom from colonial rule, as well as 
those invested in democracy. Such sympathy led to support for the Algerian movement through 
putting pressure on France, which pushed Charles de Gaulle towards reaching an agreement with 
the F.L.N. Various delegations and individuals brought the situation in Algeria to the UN’s 
attention such as the Syrian delegation led by Muhammad ed-Farra.  In the 11th Assembly of 43
the General Assembly, the UN made a resolution encouraging cooperation between France and 
Algeria in the spirit of democracy.  By bringing awareness to an international stage, the conflict 44
in Algeria became an worldwide issue, especially within context of the Cold War, where the 
ideologies of communism and democracy clashed on the worldwide stage. This exposed the 
situation in Algeria to the influence of other nations’ stances and subsequent policies.  
 African countries supported Algeria’s fight for independence, as many experienced  
similar foreign dominance. Tunisia’s president, Habib Bourguiba, went so far as to ask U.S. 
president Eisenhower to encourage de Gaulle to consider “more reliable guarantees of self-
determination” for Algeria.  By using his political sway to publicly encourage the president of a 45
highly influential nation to support Algeria, Bourguiba spurred political discourse about other 
democratic nations’ duty to support democracy internationally. Nine independent African States 
 Muhammad El-Farra, "The Algerian Tragedy." Africa Today 3, no. 4 (1956): 7-9, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43
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met with the intention to discuss how to recognize the GPRA  at the Monrovia Conference. At 46
this conference, the nations urged NATO to encourage France to stop using NATO resources in 
Algeria.  By encouraging NATO, a group formed in response to the spread of communism, such 47
international sympathy continued to elevate the Algerian War from a simple domestic crisis to an 
international crisis that could very well influence the spread of democracy. Such crises led to the 
attention of powerful democracies. 
 The United States, a major power of NATO, placed economic pressure on France to 
lessen their influence over Algeria. In January 1958, when French diplomat Jean Monnet 
attempted to get loans for his nation, he had to sign an agreement, declaring that France would 
“demobilize 150,000 troops that had been raised for the Algerian War.”  As Matthew Connelly 48
alluded to, while U.S. leaders were more likely concerned about the F.L.N. turning to support 
from communist states like the U.S.S.R., rather than being concerned about France threatening 
the future of a new democracy, such an agreement placed France in a compromising situation.  49
Charles de Gaulle placed France’s economy at risk with the continued war efforts while its social 
and political scene continued to be filled with strife and tension. With both of these spheres being 
threatened, the decision of Charles de Gaulle to create a referendum for the liberation of Algeria 
through the Évian Accords seemed more like a reasonable solution to a multitude of issues 
 Gouverment Provisoire de la République Algérienne46
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including, but not limited to the divided pieds-noirs and the Muslim Algerians, the questionable 
ethicality of France’s actions in Algeria, and France’s unstable economy.  
 Some French, particularly the pieds-noirs, saw the Muslim Algerian’s fight for an 
independent Algeria as unwarranted. Both pieds-noirs and extremist nationalists opposed various 
reforms implemented to aid Muslim Algerians for two very different reasons. Extreme 
nationalists boycotted these reforms because these reforms created a stronger tie between France 
and Algeria.  Arguably, if France was indeed attempting to provide more rights to Muslim 50
Algerians instead of continuing to oppress them, then Algerians desiring freedom from France 
had little motivation for opposing France. However, such assumption overlooks the context of 
France’s rule over Algeria. After 120 years, native Algerians still did not have equal rights in 
comparison to the pieds-noirs, in spite of reforms and citizenship, the largely Muslim, native 
Algerian population would still have to renounce their religion. If France failed to create a 
equitable state in Algeria, even after 120 years, nationalists who desired secession had an 
understandable reason for mistrusting the ability of reforms to emend the divide between the 
pieds-noirs and native Algerians.  
 In attempting to determine the reasons as to how Algeria won the Algerian War, the large 
majority of primary sources in English observed the situation in an international light, and often 
overlooked how the situation was viewed within France and Algeria. Work written in France or 
Algeria often came from French-born observers, and thus, failed to encapsulate the stances of 
native Algerians. Finding a source that came from a Muslim Algerian would have been beneficial 
in better comprehending the situation from a different perspective. As such, the nuanced structure 
 Sherman, 13850
 14
of Algerian society before the Algerian War could not be fully explored in detail within this 
paper.  
 Ultimately, the victory of Algeria in the Algerian War cannot be credited to a single 
explicit reason, but rather various implicit forces. While technically ended by Charles de Gaulle’s 
decision to hold a referendum on the issue, Charles de Gaulle’s desire to or ability to hold a 
referendum depended on a large variety of factors. The war, following the referendum, was 
democratically ended with the Évian Accords. The most prominent factors in encouraging the 
end of the war were the F.L.N.’s ability to unify Muslim Algerians, the domestic outcry from 
mainland France incited by the use of torture, and international support. The Algerian War serves 
as a model for war against colonial rule that ultimately succeeds not by military victories, but 
through democratic means. 
 While Algeria still faces consequences of the Algerian War, from the lack of multiparty 
systems until 1989, to the influence that Algeria’s military leaders continue to hold over Algeria’s 
democracy, Algerians still possess the same desire for self-determination that they demonstrated 
in the Algerian War.  In desiring free and fair elections, demonstrators are currently calling for 51
the cancellation of the upcoming December elections, which would only continue the tyrant-like 
rule of military leaders.  While Algerian demonstrators are now seeking liberation from the 52
oppression caused by groups derived from nationalist and military groups, such as the current 
Youcef Bouandel, “Political Parties and the Transition from Authoritarianism: The Case of Algeria,” The Journal 51
of Modern African Studies 41, no. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003): 2, https://www.jstor.org/stable/
3876187
 Hannah Brown, “Algeria’s Forgotten Protesters,” Vox, November 14, 2019, https://www.vox.com/world/52
2019/11/14/20961104/algeria-protests
 15
version of the F.L.N., Algerians’ motivations arguably have not changed: Algerians continue to 
desire their own state where their voices are heard through democracy, untainted by corruption.  
 16
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